Derechos de propiedad informales y costos de transacción: una evaluación económica del sistema de titulación urbana en el Perú

Abstract

This article analyzed Peru's urban land registration system from the perspective of institutional economics, examining the widespread formalization of informal property, which helped reduce transaction costs and promote the economic integration of beneficiary families. Drawing on the theories of Ronald Coase, Douglas North, and Hernando de Soto, as well as empirical data from the COFOPRI-SUNARP program, the article demonstrated that large-scale property formalization did not improve housing affordability nor generate genuine changes in the informal market. This gap, although significant, was attributed to various institutional costs that persisted despite formalization, including costly and inaccessible public registration systems, systematically restricted access to banking services, and fragmented regulations that complicated transactions. Through a comparative analysis of cases in Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras, the article identified the main limitations of the Peruvian model and proposed pathways for future reform, based on three main pillars: linking land ownership to land-use planning, effectively reducing transaction costs following property transfer, and significantly simplifying regulations to promote efficient land use.